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to develop a satisfactory approach to deciding which contact terms sellers may provide after purchase is of
great significance in light of the rapid proliferation of rolling contracts. In this article, Friedman proposes a
mechanism that will ensure that sellers have the flexibility to defer presentation of some terms but that will
also protect purchasers against the unfair imposition of unexpected and important terms arriving at a time
when purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them. The mechanism he proposes, which he refers to as
Template Notice, is an intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing concerns of both buyers and
sellers. It would require sellers to provide the following vital information before or during purchase: a brief
and clear list or summary of terms that the buyer will not see until after purchase, a statement that the buyer
will have the right to reject the terms and avoid the transaction, and a description of how to exercise that right.
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contract terms. Sellers would still be able to defer terms, but to a more limited extent than is currently
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and commentators have typically either embraced or 
rejected rolling contracts.  This Article offers a third alternative:  
improving the rolling contract.  
Courts have failed to develop a satisfactory approach for 
determining which contract terms sellers may provide after 
purchase—a failure of significance given the proliferation of rolling 
contracts.  Courts enforcing rolling contracts have given sellers nearly 
unfettered ability to delay disclosure of contract terms.1  Buyers now 
routinely find important contract terms, such as arbitration 
provisions and limitations on damages, inside the box of a newly 
purchased item instead of learning about the terms before or during 
purchase or order (as would be the case in a traditional contract). 
In this Article, I propose a mechanism that will ensure that sellers 
continue to have needed flexibility to defer some contract terms, but 
that will also protect purchasers against the unfair imposition of 
unexpected and important contract terms arriving at a time when 
purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them. 
The proposal, which I refer to as “Template Notice,” is an 
intermediate form of disclosure that meets the pressing concerns of 
both buyers and sellers.  It would not require sellers to provide the 
full text of all contract terms before or during purchase or order.  It 
would, however, require sellers to do more than merely give notice 
that unspecified additional terms will be forthcoming.  Sellers would 
be required to provide the following vital information before or 
during purchase or order:  a brief and clear list or summary of 
important terms being deferred (but not the full text), a statement 
that the buyer will have the right to reject the terms and avoid the 
transaction, and a description of how to exercise that right.  For 
                                                          
 1. See discussion infra Part I. 
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example, a potential purchaser of a computer placing an order over 
the telephone might be told by the sales representative that: 
Inside the box with your computer there will be some additional 
contract terms.  Among other things, those terms limit the time 
you would have to sue us if there is a problem, limit the damages 
you could be awarded, and require binding arbitration of any 
disputes between us.  Those terms will be in the box and you can 
return the computer if they are not acceptable.  You can also 
obtain them now if you would like through our website, or I will 
send them to you. 
 
I choose the term “Template Notice” because the information 
provided at purchase or order should establish the overall form or 
template of the transaction.  It recognizes the primacy of the 
purchase to the transaction, while also recognizing that the contract 
is not completely closed to new terms at that point.  Sellers can and 
should be able to defer some terms until after purchase or order, but 
only to a more limited extent than is currently permitted.  Template 
Notice provides an appropriate limitation on the ability of sellers to 
defer terms:  sellers would have the flexibility to delay terms, but 
could do so only for terms that flesh out details of the information 
provided at purchase.  Terms beyond the structure established at 
purchase or order could not be added “out of the blue.” 
There are a number of reasons why Template Notice should be 
adopted as part of the rolling contract.  First, Template Notice 
reinforces some of the justifications for enforcing rolling contracts.  
Second, Template Notice is fair to both buyers and sellers.  Template 
Notice is a compromise—one that builds on existing practice and 
would be relatively easy to implement.  Third, Template Notice would 
make assent to deferred terms more meaningful.  Fourth, Template 
Notice makes sense given the structure and the rhythm of rolling 
contracts.  Finally, Template Notice helps to clarify the contractual 
significance of documents and actions in the post-purchase period of 
a transaction. 
In addition, Template Notice emerges from an application of the 
doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations to the 
deferral of terms.  As an unfortunate consequence of an approach to 
rolling contracts that focuses on the mechanics and timing of 
contract formation, these doctrines have largely been sidelined from 
the assessment of the unique aspects of rolling contracts.  These 
doctrines could play a useful role if they were fully applied to the 
deferral of terms.  That application need not, and in fact should not, 
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result in the end of rolling contracts.  Instead, it would result in their 
improvement. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  In Part I, I provide a brief 
overview of the rolling contract.  In Part II, I describe how the pre-
purchase notice requirement articulated in early rolling contract 
cases has been reduced to a near nullity.  In Part III, I present the 
arguments in support of Template Notice.  Finally, in Part IV, I 
address how unconscionability and reasonable expectations could be 
adapted and applied to rolling contracts. 
Before proceeding further, a brief note on terminology:  Although 
the term “rolling contract” does not pass without objection,2 given its 
widespread use I will employ that term in this Article.  I will describe 
as “deferred terms” those terms that are presented after purchase or 
order and will use the phrase “deferral of terms” to describe the 
practice of presenting some contract terms after purchase or order. 
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ROLLING CONTRACTS 
Rolling contracts3 are contracts formed over time, with the seller 
presenting the terms in batches.  Some terms are provided before or 
during the purchase or order, while others are provided later.  These 
transactions typically give the buyer a right to return a purchased 
item or cancel a purchased service to avoid the transaction.4 
                                                          
 2. Professor Jean Braucher has pointed out that the label “rolling contract” is a 
loaded one since it seems to take for granted that terms presented after purchase or 
order are part of the contract (a position with which Professor Braucher takes great 
issue).  She would cast the issue as the enforceability of delayed terms.  Jean 
Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision to Trust the Courts:  The Case Against 
Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 757-
58 (2004).  Professor Peter Alces suggests that it is more accurate to describe the 
judicial acceptance of rolling contracts as giving rise to “checkerboard contract[s],” 
contracts that are formed under “a regime that relies on traditional contract doctrine 
when it suits and on practical considerations when it does not.”  Peter A. Alces, On 
Discovering Doctrine:  “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 471, 497 (2005). 
  3.  We are probably nearly at the point when “rolling contract” no longer needs 
to be defined.  Rolling contracts have, after all, made their way into the casebooks for 
the first-year Contracts course.  See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS 
ON CONTRACTS 116 (4th ed. 2004); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CONTRACTS 222 (6th ed. 2001); BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN 
LAW OF CONTRACTS 189, 190, 195 (2005); CHARLES L. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT 
LAW 255, 259 (5th ed. 2003). The term “rolling contracts” has also apparently won its 
skirmish with the once-competing term “layered contracts,” a term previously used by 
some courts.  See Puget Sound Fin., LLC v. Unisearch, 47 P.3d 940, 944 (Wash. 2002) 
(using the term “layered contracts” to refer to a contract where the full terms are 
disclosed after purchase); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 
P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (same).  The Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (“UCITA”) describes these contracts as both “rolling” and 
“layered.”  UCITA § 202 cmt. 4, 7 U.L.A. pt. II, at 276 (2002). 
 4. See generally Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 
(2002) (describing the mechanics of rolling contracts). 
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Rolling contracts are premised on the idea that the contract forms, 
not at purchase or order, but only after the expiration of the “accept-
or-return period.”  In two highly influential decisions, ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg5 and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals pushed back the time of contract formation to accommodate 
deferred terms.  In ProCD, the court assessed the enforceability of 
license terms included inside a box of software.  The buyer argued 
that since the contract formed when he bought the software, he was 
not bound by terms that were only visible after purchase.7  The court 
rejected the premise that the contract had been formed at purchase.  
Instead, the court held that the seller had structured the transaction 
so that the failure to return the software during the accept-or-return 
period, and not the purchase, constituted acceptance.8  Thus, the 
court found it unnecessary to consider whether the deferred terms 
became part of the contract under the “battle of the forms” provision 
of the Uniform Commercial Code9 (“U.C.C.”) since the terms were 
part of the contract under basic principles of offer and acceptance.10  
In the court’s view, the return option not only compensated for the 
failure to disclose complete terms at the time of purchase, but also 
served as the very vehicle for enforcing the deferred terms.11 
According to the court, by enforcing terms presented after 
purchase it was doing nothing new or even particularly noteworthy, 
and “[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to 
return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may 
be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”12  
The court did more than merely tolerate the tradeoff of a return 
option for disclosure at the time of purchase; it seemed to actually 
prefer the return option.  After all, the court noted, the deferred 
terms can be read “in the comfort of home”13 and “at [the buyer’s] 
leisure.”14  The return option gives the buyer a “chance to make a 
final decision after a detailed review,”15 presumably in contrast to 
forcing a consumer to read through contract terms under the time 
pressures inherent in most purchases.  Further, the court noted that 
                                                          
 5. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 6. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 7. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450. 
 8. Id. at 1452-53.  
 9. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005). 
 10. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-53. 
 11. Id.   
 12. Id. at 1451. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1452. 
 15. Id. at 1453. 
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full disclosure of all terms at the time of purchase would have 
required “microscopic type” or the removal of other more useful 
information (such as a description of what the software does).16  
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that courts should treat 
standardized terms in shrinkwrap software licenses (an early species 
of rolling contract) no differently than standardized terms presented 
at purchase.17 
The Seventh Circuit subsequently made clear that its approval of 
the deferral of terms was not limited to shrinkwrap licenses and that 
sellers in a variety of contexts could substitute such deferral for 
complete up-front disclosure of terms.  In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,18 
the Seventh Circuit enforced an arbitration provision that had not 
been mentioned by the sales representative when the computer was 
purchased.  The seller included the provision inside the box in which 
the purchased computer was shipped.19  The seller of the computer 
used what the court characterized as the same sort of “accept-or-
return offer” that had been used in ProCD.20  The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ arguments that the holding in ProCD should be limited to 
the context of that case.21  Instead, as in ProCD, the court focused on 
the practical difficulties inherent in making full disclosure of all 
terms at the time of purchase.22  Additionally, as in ProCD, the court 
was satisfied that the contract had not been formed until after the 
accept-or-return period expired.23 
The influence of ProCD and Hill has been significant, in large part 
because those cases have set the terms of the debate and resulted in a 
focus on the timing and mechanics of contract formation.  Rolling 
contracts are said by courts enforcing them to be premised on the 
“proposition that a contract is formed not at the time of purchase or 
earlier but rather when the purchaser either rejects by seeking a 
refund or assents by not doing so within a specified time.”24  In 
contrast, courts refusing to enforce deferred terms tend to take the 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 1451.  
 17. See id. at 1449 (concluding that shrinkwrap licenses “are enforceable unless 
their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general” such as 
unconscionability). 
 18. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 19. See id. at 1148 (describing the transaction at issue).   
 20. Id. at 1149. 
 21. Id. at 1149-50.   
 22. See id. at 1149 (discussing impracticability of cashiers or sales representatives 
reading several pages of legal documents to potential customers).   
 23. Id. at 1148-49.   
 24. Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am., 134 Fed. App’x 828, 831 (6th Cir. 
2005) (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 431 n.43 (2d Cir. 
2004)). 
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position that the contract was formed at purchase or order.25  As the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recently noted, whether a court enforces 
deferred terms is often based on that “court’s determination of when 
the contract was formed.”26 
Additionally, as noted, both the ProCD and Hill opinions focused 
on the difficulties inherent in requiring sellers to make complete 
disclosure of all terms at purchase or order.  Neither opinion 
contemplated the possibility of requiring something less than 
complete disclosure.  These cases set up something of a false choice 
between the extremes of either requiring complete disclosure of the 
full text of all terms at purchase or requiring no disclosure of the 
substance of deferred terms.  The possibility of an intermediate 
approach, such as Template Notice, apparently was not considered. 
II. DIMINUTION OF NOTICE AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE 
ROLLING CONTRACT 
A. Pre-Purchase Notice in Early Rolling Contract Jurisprudence 
The court in ProCD seemed to counsel that notice is a component 
of a proper rolling contract, observing that “[n]otice on the outside, 
terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if 
the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business 
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”27  However, the notice element 
in ProCD did not evolve into the type of notice I propose in this 
Article.  Instead, in relatively short order, notice was reduced nearly 
to the vanishing point.  This development has been made possible, I 
think, by the fact that the usual doctrines that might police the 
deferral of terms, such as unconscionability, have largely been absent 
from the discussion.28 
Although ProCD indicated that a buyer should have notice that 
additional terms will be forthcoming, the court did not appear to 
contemplate a particularly robust notice requirement.  The district 
court in ProCD described the “sole reference” to the license 
                                                          
 25. See, e.g., Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 
(D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that contract was formed when seller agreed to ship the 
goods or, at the latest, when the goods were actually shipped).   
 26. Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 127 P.3d 560, 566 (Okla. 2005); see also I.Lan 
Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(observing that the difference in the outcome of cases depends on when courts 
determine the contract was formed). 
 27. ProCD, Inc.  v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 28. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2 (reviewing the reluctance of courts to apply 
the doctrine of unconscionability to rolling contracts). 
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agreement that would have been visible before purchase of the 
software as a “disclosure in small print at the bottom of the package, 
stating that defendants were subject to the terms and conditions of 
the enclosed license agreement.”29  For the Seventh Circuit, that 
reference was sufficient notice.30  Given the particular facts of ProCD, 
that decision is understandable.  The purchase in ProCD was of a 
database containing information from thousands of telephone 
directories and the provision at issue was a restriction on making 
commercial use of the database.31  A reasonable consumer 
(particularly one as sophisticated as the defendant in ProCD)32 with 
knowledge that the purchase was subject to a license agreement 
would likely expect the license to include such a term.  The court’s 
reluctance to set a high notice standard may simply have been an 
unfortunate consequence of the fact that the particular provision at 
issue in ProCD was of a type that the buyer should have 
contemplated.33  Instead, the court indicated that any term not 
requiring special notice (such as a warranty disclaimer that must be 
conspicuous)34 was “covered” by the general notice of a license 
agreement.35 
The Seventh Circuit subsequently further delineated the role of 
notice in rolling contracts.  In Hill, the court found sufficient notice 
of a deferred arbitration clause based on some advertisements that 
vaguely referenced terms completely unrelated to the arbitration 
clause.36  The arbitration clause was included in the packaging of a 
computer that had been ordered over the phone.37  The court held 
that the buyers had notice at the time of the order that there would 
be additional terms.38  This conclusion was based on a rather slender 
reed.  According to the court, the computer manufacturer’s 
advertisements stated “that their products come with limited 
warranties and lifetime support” (although the advertisements 
                                                          
 29. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 654 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d, 86 
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 30. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453. 
 31. Id. at 1449. 
 32. The defendant formed and ran a corporation to resell the information from 
the database he purchased.  Id. at 1450. 
 33. Additionally, the plaintiff-purchaser’s actions in making commercial use of 
the database hardly made him sympathetic to the court.  See James J. White, 
Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723, 741 (2004) (noting that the 
ultimate outcome in ProCD was probably justified since “Zeidenberg was surely a 
naughty fellow who deserved to have his hands slapped”). 
 34. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2005). 
 35. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453. 
 36. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 37. See id. at 1148 (describing the circumstances of the computer purchase). 
 38. Id. at 1150. 
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presumably mentioned nothing about arbitration).39  For the Seventh 
Circuit, the knowledge of the limited warranty and lifetime technical 
support imparted by these advertisements presumably triggered, or 
should have triggered, a number of questions in the minds of the 
purchasers:  “How limited was the warranty—30 days, with service 
contingent on shipping the computer back, or five years, with free 
onsite service?  What sort of support was offered?”40 
The court indicated that if the buyers had really been interested in 
finding the additional terms before purchase, they could have done 
so.  The court stressed that the buyers could have asked the seller to 
“send a copy.”41  However, the court failed to specify a copy of what.  
As the court observed, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,42 the 
buyers could have requested a copy of the warranty.43  But that 
warranty would not have included the arbitration clause at issue in 
Hill.  The court’s solution—that the computer manufacturer would 
not have refused to send the complete terms—is a bit 
underwhelming since the buyers were not aware that there were any 
other contract terms to request.44 
Additionally, the court noted that the buyers could have taken it on 
themselves to “consult public sources,” such as computer magazines 
and websites, to search out complete terms of the contract.45  As with 
the alternative of requesting the terms from the manufacturer, a 
potential buyer would really have no idea what types of terms to look 
for or whether it was worth his or her time to make the effort in the 
first place.  Further, locating the correct magazine or finding the 
correct terms on a website is often no easy feat.46 
Whatever one might say about the significance of the notice of 
deferred terms in both ProCD and Hill, at least the notice was 
provided before the purchase was complete in both those cases.  In 
                                                          
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2004). 
 43. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.   
 44. The advertisement of “lifetime support” referred to by the court does not 
signal additional terms.  Instead, most buyers would probably perceive the statement 
as promising technical support over the phone or Internet and would not suspect 
that any contract term would be needed to flesh out the promise.  At any rate, the 
statement would be more likely to reassure than raise concerns. 
 45. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.   
 46. There is also the problem that sellers typically reserve the right to change the 
terms at any time without notice, so there is no assurance that whatever terms a 
potential buyer finds will be the ones ultimately applicable to the buyer’s transaction.  
See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (Civ. Ct. 2001) (noting that these 
changes can happen before a purchaser has a meaningful chance to review the 
terms). 
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fact, both opinions stressed the importance of such notice being 
provided before purchase.  The court in Hill noted while explaining 
its reasoning in ProCD that:  “Consumers browsing the aisles of a store 
can look at the box, and if they are unwilling to deal with the 
prospect of additional terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the 
transaction costs of returning the package after reviewing its 
contents.”47  This choice of whether to avoid the contract completely 
can only be made if notice of deferred terms is provided at or before 
purchase.  Similarly, the court in ProCD noted that one of the terms 
the buyer agreed to “by purchasing the software [was] that the 
transaction was subject to a license.”48  Notice of such license thus had 
to have been provided before the purchase was complete.   
Although the notice in ProCD and Hill may have been weak, at least 
it came before purchase or order.  As I discuss in the next Section, 
subsequent cases have further reduced the role of notice in rolling 
contracts. 
B. Reduction of the Role of Notice in Rolling Contracts 
Courts assessing rolling contracts subsequent to ProCD and Hill 
rendered the notice requirement even less substantial by largely 
ignoring the rationale of ProCD and Hill as it relates to the 
importance of pre-purchase notice.  Such courts have been satisfied 
even if notice of deferred terms is provided after purchase.  For 
instance, in Schafer v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.,49 the plaintiff 
purchased cellular phone service over the telephone.  The plaintiff 
challenged the validity of an arbitration clause that was contained 
inside a “Welcome Guide,” alleging that she had never received the 
Welcome Guide.50  The court was unconcerned with the plaintiff’s 
claim that she had not received the Welcome Guide because, whether 
or not the plaintiff received the Welcome Guide, she had notice of 
it.51  This notice was provided by a statement on the box in which the 
phone was shipped after the customer had already ordered the 
phone service.52  While that notice was received before contract 
formation (at least as formation was viewed by the Schafer court),53 
pre-formation notice, as opposed to pre-purchase notice, does not 
serve the concerns outlined in ProCD and Hill.  Indeed, despite the 
                                                          
 47. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. 
 48. ProCD, Inc.  v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 49. No. Civ. 04-4149-JLF, 2005 WL 850459 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2005). 
 50. Id. at *3.   
 51. Id. at *3-5.   
 52. Id. at *5. 
 53. See id. (noting that acceptance occurred by use of the telephone service). 
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Schafer court’s heavy reliance on Hill,54 Hill actually makes quite 
explicit that the language on a shipping box provided after purchase 
is irrelevant to the question of notice.55 
Schafer is not the only court to disregard the rationale for pre-
purchase notice.  The Washington Supreme Court in M.A. Mortenson 
Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp.56 ignored it as well.  Mortenson 
involved the enforceability of a limitation on consequential damages 
that was included in a shrinkwrap license accompanying purchased 
software.57  The term was provided with the purchased software along 
with a provision giving the buyer the right to return the product for a 
refund if the terms were not acceptable.58  The court referenced the 
“notice on the outside” language of ProCD,59 but seemed to ignore any 
requirement of pre-purchase notice.  Instead, the court found that 
there had been sufficient notice of the license terms since the terms 
were in the shrinkwrap package, the manual, and the software 
protection devices.60  Additionally, the license was mentioned on the 
first screen each time the consumer used the software.61  But the 
problem with this analysis is the same as in Schafer:  although the 
terms were provided before the point at which the contract was (in 
the court’s view) formed,62 neither the terms nor any notice of them 
were presented before purchase. 
While cases like Mortenson and Schafer represent an inappropriate 
step away from the pre-purchase notice contemplated in Hill and 
ProCD, at least they acknowledge the notice component of a rolling 
contract.  Other courts do not even mention the need for any notice, 
pre-purchase or otherwise, and instead focus only on the buyer’s 
ability to return the product or cancel the service for a refund.63 
                                                          
 54. See id. at *4-5. 
 55. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing 
that lack of notice of terms on a shipping box was immaterial since such notice 
would not have been seen before purchase).   
 56. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000). 
 57. Id.  at 307. 
 58. Id. at 308. 
 59. Id. at 312-13.   
 60. Id. at 313.   
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. (stating that the buyer’s “use of the software constituted assent to the 
agreement”). 
 63. See, e.g., Westendorf v. Gateway, 2000 Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) (following rationale of Hill without mention of whether buyer 
had notice that additional terms would be involved in transaction); Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (same); see also O’Quin v. 
Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003) (determining, without 
discussion of whether buyer had notice of additional terms before signing contract, 
that the arbitration agreement in a cellular telephone service plan was enforceable 
even though it was provided after service contract was signed); Lozano v. AT&T 
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C. Insignificant Consequences for Failure to Provide Notice 
The notice aspect of rolling contracts is further weakened by the 
apparent lack of any significant consequences to a seller for failure to 
provide notice.  The court in Hill raised, but did not fully address, 
what would happen if a seller were to attempt to disclose a term after 
purchase without any pre-purchase notice that the transaction would 
involve deferred terms:  “Perhaps the [purchasers] would have had a 
better argument if they were first alerted to [the existence of 
deferred terms] after opening the box and wanted to return the 
computer to avoid the disagreeable terms but were dissuaded by the 
expense of shipping.”64 
The court had no reason to fully meet the issue (since the Hills had 
the notice required by the court), but the court’s language indicates 
a high burden for a buyer seeking to argue that the seller should be 
penalized for not providing notice.  The buyer would apparently have 
to establish that he read the term at issue, found the term 
disagreeable, and would have returned the good but for the shipping 
costs—a burden of proof that would severely limit the number of 
claims that could successfully be made. 
Nor is it clear what remedy awaits a buyer who could meet this high 
burden.  One might expect that the remedy would be non-
enforcement of the term—the result that would flow from a finding 
of unconscionability65 or from a finding that a term was beyond the 
reasonable expectations of the buyer.66  However, the court’s dictum 
on this point indicates that the potential consequence to the seller 
would be minuscule:  “What [would] the remedy be [if the buyer had 
no notice of the existence of additional terms until after purchase]—
could it exceed the shipping charges?”67  The question is, for the 
court, “interesting,” but is not addressed any further.68 
In the balance of this Article, I explain why and how the notice 
aspect of rolling contracts should be restored and enhanced through 
Template Notice. 
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TEMPLATE NOTICE 
In this Part of the Article, I provide a number of arguments in favor 
of Template Notice.  In Section A, I argue that Template Notice 
                                                          
Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (similar). 
 64. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 65. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). 
 67. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.   
 68. Id. 
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enhances some of the justifications for enforcing rolling contracts.  In 
Section B, I argue that Template Notice is fair to both buyers and 
sellers.  I argue as well that Template Notice builds on existing 
practice and would be relatively easy to implement.  In Section C, I 
argue that Template Notice would make assent to deferred 
standardized terms more meaningful.  In Section D, I discuss how 
Template Notice makes sense given the structure and rhythm of 
rolling contracts.  Finally, in Section E, I argue that Template Notice 
would help resolve the ambiguity over the contractual significance of 
post-purchase actions and documents that is inherent in rolling 
contracts. 
A. Template Notice Reinforces the Justifications for Rolling Contracts 
Perhaps the most straightforward argument in support of Template 
Notice is that it takes seriously two justifications in support of rolling 
contracts:  first, that a buyer concerned about contract terms can opt 
to seek them out before purchase, and second, that a buyer unwilling 
to proceed with a transaction involving deferred terms can opt not to 
enter into the transaction in the first place.  Template Notice 
reinforces both of these justifications. 
Enforcement of rolling contracts has often been justified by the 
fact that if buyers are really interested in the terms, they can obtain 
them before purchase.  In Hill, for example, the court’s decision to 
enforce an arbitration provision seemed premised largely on the idea 
that if the buyers had been interested in the full text of the deferred 
terms, the buyers could have and would have obtained them before 
buying their computers.  The court in Hill noted that the buyers had 
three choices in this regard:  (1) request the terms from the seller, 
(2) find them in magazines or on websites, or (3) wait and read them 
when the terms arrive with the computer.69  The buyers in Hill 
knowingly passed up the opportunity to find the terms in advance of 
purchase and that decision seemed to justify, at least in part, the 
court’s decision to enforce those terms.70 
Similarly, in Crawford v. Talk America, Inc.,71 the court enforced an 
arbitration provision that had not been provided or described at the 
time that phone service was ordered.72  At the conclusion of the 
telephone conversation in which plaintiff ordered the telephone 
service, a third party verifier informed her that “[f]or complete 
                                                          
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. No. 05-CV-0180-DRH, 2005 WL 2465909 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2005). 
 72. Id. at *2-5. 
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information about [her] services,” the purchaser could go on-line or 
call the company’s toll free number.73  The purchaser also received a 
notice after completing her order informing her that she could 
review full contract terms on-line or call or write the service provider 
if she had a question.74 Despite the fact that the purchaser never 
received a hard copy of the terms, the court still enforced the 
arbitration provision.75  The court’s holding was motivated in part by 
the fact that the buyer knew there were additional terms and could 
have sought them out.76 
Because courts enforce deferred terms when a buyer could have 
found them before purchase, it seems reasonable to at least let the 
buyer know what to look for if the buyer chooses to try to find these 
terms.  That is, basic fairness dictates that if courts are going to 
attribute to buyers any knowledge that they could have obtained by 
some effort, then buyers ought to at least have a hint as to what that 
knowledge involves.  This is a function that Template Notice would 
serve well. 
Perhaps more importantly, Template Notice gives the buyer the 
information needed to decide whether the types of terms at issue are 
important enough for the buyer to make the effort to seek out the 
details in the first place (especially since seeking out the terms 
requires more than simply looking through a single document).  In 
other words, the computer purchasers in Hill might have deemed the 
exact details of the “limited warranty” or the “lifetime support” 
insufficiently important to research further.  However, if the 
purchasers had known that there were terms that affected their right 
to sue in court, they may have thought it worthwhile to search out the 
details of such terms. 
Hill is also premised on the notion that a buyer unwilling to 
proceed with a transaction that involves deferred terms can simply 
refrain from making the purchase in the first place.  The court in Hill 
observed that consumers “browsing the aisles of a store can look at 
the box, and if they are unwilling to deal with the prospect of 
additional terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the transactions 
                                                          
 73. Id. at *3. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at *4-5; cf. Schlessinger v. Holland Am., N.V., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 5, 11 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (observing that even though passenger had not received her ticket with 
the relevant forum selection provision until after she had made payment for the 
ticket, she had “ample opportunity” to learn of the terms either through the cruise 
line’s website or from her travel agent). 
 76. Crawford, 2005 WL 2465909, at *4. 
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costs of returning the package after reviewing its contents.”77  The 
purchase thus serves as something of a threshold through which the 
buyer can decide whether or not to enter the transaction.  However, 
this threshold function can only be served if potential buyers have 
notice of the existence of additional terms before purchase.  
Furthermore, this function can be much better served by requiring 
sellers to provide potential buyers with some indication of what these 
deferred terms will be, rather than merely requiring notice that there 
will be some unspecified deferred terms.  The additional information 
provided by Template Notice would enable buyers to make better-
informed decisions about whether or not to proceed with a 
transaction. 
B. Template Notice is Fair to Both Buyers and Sellers 
Because it addresses many of the concerns of those who oppose any 
deferral of terms, as well as the concerns of those who oppose 
requiring complete pre-purchase disclosure of contract terms, 
Template Notice represents a sensible middle ground that is fair to 
both buyers and sellers.  Further, it builds on existing practice and 
would be relatively easy to implement. 
1. Concerns that deferral of terms is unfair to buyers 
A number of factors may negatively impact the likelihood that 
deferred terms will be read or acted on.  These factors lead some 
commentators to describe rolling contracts as an “extreme version of 
an adhesion contract.”78 
By the time a buyer actually sees the full terms, the buyer is already 
committed, both financially and psychologically, to the transaction.  
Professor Jean Braucher has compared the rolling contract, at least in 
some contexts, to the “bait and switch” sales tactic:  both take 
advantage of the consumer’s investment of time and energy in a 
given transaction before the consumer is provided full information.79  
Professor Braucher has also noted that while it is certainly possible 
that only a small percentage of buyers read terms presented before 
                                                          
 77. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 78. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 233, 249 (2002). 
 79. Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and 
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1853 (2000); cf. Jane M. Rolling, The UCC 
Under Wraps:  Exposing the Need for More Notice to Consumers of Computer Software with 
Shrinkwrapped Licenses, 104 COM. L.J. 197, 226 (1999) (providing reasons why, as a 
practical matter, the option to return for a full refund may be “cost-prohibitive and 
unattainable”). 
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purchase, the phenomenon of “cognitive dissonance” may well 
decrease that percentage if terms are presented after purchase.80  
Cognitive dissonance has been described as a “form of selective 
perception in which actors give greater weight to evidence that 
confirms beliefs they already hold and lesser weight to contradictory 
evidence.”81  Thus, a buyer is unlikely to attend to any evidence that 
might demonstrate that he or she had made a mistake that needs to 
be corrected.  This would be especially so after the buyer has already 
paid for and taken delivery of a product or begun receiving a 
service.82 
In addition, Professor, now judge, Robert Keeton noted that a 
lapse of time between payment and receipt of terms may decrease the 
likelihood that deferred terms will be read.83  Professor Keeton 
observed, in discussing the making of insurance agreements, that: 
the normal processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do not 
ordinarily place the detailed policy terms in the hands of the 
policyholder until the contract has already been made.  In life 
insurance marketing, for example, the policyholder does not 
ordinarily see the policy terms until he has signed the application 
(his offer to contract with the company) and has paid a premium, 
and the company has approved the application and has executed 
and issued the policy.  This often means a delay of weeks, and 
occasionally even longer, between making an application and 
having possession of the policy—a factor enhancing the 
policyholder’s disinclination to read his policy carefully or even to 
read it at all.84 
This description applies neatly to rolling contracts as well. 
A phenomenon referred to as the “endowment effect” may also 
work to reduce the likelihood that the buyer will read the deferred 
terms.  The endowment effect “stands for the principle that people 
tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do 
not.”85 
                                                          
 80. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 765-66 (observing that after a consumer has 
paid for and taken delivery of a good, the effects of cognitive dissonance would likely 
be quite strong).   
 81. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Removing 
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 n.163 
(2000) (citing LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)). 
 82. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 765-66. 
 83. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1228 (2003). 
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Research in the field of marketing by Professor Stacy Wood 
provides some evidence that the endowment effect may reduce the 
likelihood that deferred terms in a rolling contract will be read.  
Professor Wood conducted a number of experiments to assess the 
effect of return policies in the context of “remote sales”—sales in 
which the buyer shops through the Internet, catalogs, or television 
home shopping networks.86  Consumers are likely to regard remote 
sales, which involve a time lag between order and receipt of goods, as 
a “two-stage process involving separate order and keep-or-return 
decisions.”87  Analysis of decision-making in remote sales is thus 
relevant to rolling contracts since many rolling contracts meet the 
definition of remote sales.  Even rolling contracts made in an on-site 
retail environment have the same fundamental structure of a two-
stage process:  first, a decision to purchase, and second, a decision to 
“keep-or-return.” 
Professor Wood’s experiments demonstrate that the endowment 
effect reduces the amount of deliberation that occurs in the “keep-or-
return” decision in remote sales.  These experiments compared the 
deliberation time between purchases with lenient return policies and 
those with more stringent return policies.  The experiments revealed 
that a lenient return policy reduces the amount of deliberation time 
a buyer gives to a purchase at the time of order since the buyer knows 
that it will be easy to return the purchased item if the buyer is 
dissatisfied.88  One would expect a corresponding increase in post-
purchase deliberation time after the product is received.  However, 
no such increase materialized in Professor Wood’s experiments.89 
Professor Wood attributes this relative overall decrease in 
deliberation time to the endowment effect resulting from feelings of 
ownership in the ordered good90—feelings that may even arise at the 
time of order, before actual ownership or physical possession.91  Thus, 
Professor Wood notes that in this two-stage process, “the consumers 
who cavalierly order a product because they know it is easily returned 
may fail to give sufficient deliberation to the decision to keep or 
return the product because of a sense of ownership and perceived 
                                                          
 86. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments:  The Influence of Return Policy 
Leniency on Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 157, 157 (May 2001). 
 87. Id. at 159. 
 88. Id. at 167. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 158. 
 91. Id. (citing Sankar Sen & Eric Johnson, Mere-Possession Effects without Possession 
in Consumer Choice, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 24, 105-18 (1997)). 
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value.”92  Although Professor Wood addresses post-purchase 
deliberation over the good itself as opposed to deliberation over 
contract terms, it seems plausible that the same ownership effects she 
identifies would also decrease the time spent considering the contract 
terms provided after purchase or order.93 
Template Notice responds to these concerns, at least partially, by 
moving the substance of deferred terms to a point before any 
investment in the purchased item or service occurs and before any 
feelings of ownership arise. 
I should note that although there are arguably valid concerns that 
deferral decreases the likelihood that terms will be read or acted on, 
not everyone shares this opinion.  For instance, Professor Robert 
Hillman has argued that deferral has no impact (or, possibly, even 
has a positive impact) on the likelihood that terms will be read.94  For 
Professor Hillman, because consumers are unlikely to read 
standardized terms “under any circumstances, the particular time at 
which they could have read them should not control their legal 
treatment.”95  Although Professor Hillman doubts that many buyers 
read standard term contracts regardless of when they are presented,96 
he indicates that deferral of terms may actually be preferable to 
disclosure before purchase or order:  “A good argument can be made 
that, if anything, the opportunity to read the terms at home creates 
more of a reason to enforce standard terms in the rolling contract 
context.”97 
Unfortunately this debate has largely been academic.  For the most 
part, courts have been unwilling to address the impact of deferral in a 
nuanced way.  For instance, in Bischoff v. DirectTV, Inc.,98 the court 
rejected an invitation to consider the impact of a lapse of time 
between the initiation of purchased television service and the 
presentation of contract terms.99  Plaintiffs in Bischoff argued that such 
                                                          
 92. Id. 
 93. Cf. Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting:  Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a 
Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12  J.L. & POL’Y 641, 724-
26 (2004) (observing that deferral of terms takes advantage of a buyer’s 
unwillingness to give up something the buyer already owns, thus forcing the buyer 
“to admit being tricked as to the deal’s real value, [and this] when coupled with the 
other cognitive defects, the inconveniences connected with return, and the cost of 
search for a replacement” make it very unlikely a buyer will ever read deferred 
terms). 
 94. Hillman, supra note 4, at 752-58. 
 95. Id. at 757. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 99. Id. at 1105.    
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a lapse was a basis for distinguishing Hill, because in Hill the terms 
accompanied the purchased computers and thus were available at the 
same time the buyers took possession of the computers.100  Instead of 
addressing the issue directly, the court focused on the “economic and 
practical considerations involved in selling services to mass 
consumers which make it acceptable for terms and conditions to 
follow the initial transaction.”101  The court thus missed an 
opportunity to assess whether the endowment effect or other factors 
might make such a lapse of time significant.  Other courts have also 
been unwilling to consider the impact that the deferral of terms may 
have on the likelihood that terms will be read or acted on.102 
It is difficult to know for certain whether the deferral of terms 
decreases the likelihood that the buyer will in fact read or act on the 
terms.  There is a reasonable argument that it does, and so Template 
Notice partially meets these concerns by pushing at least some 
additional disclosure to a time in the transaction when it is more 
likely to be noticed and when a buyer’s decision to proceed with the 
transaction is less encumbered by sunk time and costs.  Even if 
deferral does not reduce the likelihood that terms will be read, 
Template Notice would still have the salutary effect of giving the 
buyer two opportunities to become aware of the deferred terms. 
2. Concerns that requiring pre-purchase disclosure is unfair to sellers 
The previous subsection focused on concerns over the deferral of 
terms and fairness to buyers.  This Subsection, in contrast, focuses on 
concerns that requiring full disclosure of all terms before or during 
purchase would be unfair and unduly burdensome to sellers. 
Whatever fault one might find with the reasoning in ProCD and 
Hill, it is difficult to dismiss entirely Judge Easterbrook’s observation 
that a seller required to place the entire agreement on a product’s 
packaging would have to use “microscopic type” or remove other, 
more useful information, such as what the purchased item does.103  
Similarly, there is also force in the court’s statement in Hill that: 
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers 
before ringing up sales.  If the staff at the other end of the phone 
for direct-sales operations . . . had to read the four-page statement 
of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning 
                                                          
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing courts’ reluctance to seriously 
evaluate the charge of procedural unconscionability in the context of deferred terms 
and rolling contracts). 
 103. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-51 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential 
buyers.  Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their 
time.104 
Template Notice does not entail complete disclosure of all terms.  
It would not require microscopic text or a lengthy reading of terms.  
It would instead require only summary notice of the most important 
terms. 
Template Notice also addresses concerns that complete pre-
purchase disclosure would overwhelm the buyer.  As Professor 
Hillman observes, “by increasing the information available to 
consumers, the early display of terms may add to the problem of 
information overload.”105  Professor Hillman’s concern is that the 
likelihood of reading may in fact go down if we require sellers to 
disclose all information at once.106  Template Notice responds to this 
concern by calling for selective, but not fully comprehensive, early 
disclosure. 
3. Template notice as an easy to implement extension of current practice 
Template Notice is not an academic theory divorced from reality.  
A similar approach is already being implemented in the context of 
transactions contained within a single document.  It is not unusual 
for courts assessing standardized contracts contained in a single 
document to give weight to notice provisions that the seller placed at 
the beginning or on the front of an agreement.  For instance, in 
Lucido v. Dolphin Cruise Lines, Inc.,107 the court enforced a provision 
that limited a cruise passenger’s time to sue to one year.108  The court 
found that the passenger’s ticket “reasonably communicated” the 
provision because there was a clear warning on the face of the multi-
                                                          
 104. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 105. Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate:  Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 850 (2005); cf. Paul Steinberg & 
Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy:  Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 105, 302 (2004) (“Information disclosure may be used in perverse ways.  First, by 
means of ‘information overload’—the likelihood of a legal document being read in 
its entirety by a franchisee is inversely proportional to the length and complexity of 
the document”). 
 106. See Hillman, supra note 105, at 849-50 (describing reasons why required 
disclosures may be ineffective or counterproductive).  An official comment to 
Section 211 of the Restatement makes a similar point to bolster its regime of general 
enforcement of standardized terms, noting that such enforcement frees sellers and 
consumers “from attention to numberless variations and [enables buyers to] focus on 
meaningful choice among a limited number of significant features:  transaction type, 
style, quantity, price, or the like.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. a 
(1981). 
 107. No. Civ. A. 95-2560, 1996 WL 15734 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 108. Id. at *3-5. 
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page ticket that pointed out and summarized the term at issue, 
stating that:  “Attention is particularly drawn to . . . Articles 19 and 20 
which limit the periods in which notification of claim is to be made 
and suit commenced.  Failure to comply with those limitation periods 
will result in the loss of your rights.”109  The language thus drew 
“special attention to the time limit and its consequences.”110  Other 
courts have also found contract provisions were meaningfully 
communicated, at least in part, by virtue of a special reference to 
them on the face of or near the beginning of a contract.111 
The point of purchase is the contextual analogue to the face of a 
document or the space near the signature line—it is the point at 
which attention is most closely being paid to the transaction by the 
potential purchaser.  It is thus the appropriate time for Template 
Notice to be given.  As I noted earlier in the Article, it would not be 
difficult for a telephone sales representative to provide this notice112 
or for a seller to place such notice on product packaging.113   
Template Notice would impose a minimal burden on sellers.  A 
seller would not be required to highlight all the deferred terms, only 
the important ones.  The universe of terms, the enforceability of 
which sellers are truly concerned with, is probably not very large, 
consisting of such provisions as arbitration provisions and limitations 
on damages, warranties, or the time within which suit may be 
brought.114 
It might also first appear that requiring some description of the 
terms is more of a burden than simply requiring notice that an 
additional form is coming.  Professor Randy Barnett notes that in the 
                                                          
 109. Id. at *1. 
 110. Id. at *3. 
 111. See, e.g., Lowe v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (S.D. Fla. 1990) 
(explaining that the front of a ticket provided notice that the terms should be read 
carefully along with a statement that the “passengers [sic] attention is further 
directed to Clause 5 which sets forth limitation periods in which notification of claim 
is to be made and suit commenced”); Tateoasian v. Celebrity Cruise Servs., Ltd., 768 
A.2d 1248, 1251-52 (R.I. 2001) (stating that the notice clearly set forth that the 
contract provisions included limits on time in which suit may be brought). 
 112. For some suggested language that the sales representative could read, see 
supra pp. 102-03.   
 113. There would, to be sure, be situations where Template Notice is not 
practicable.  In such situations, the result need not be automatic non-enforcement 
but could instead be a heightened scrutiny of the substance of the term.  See 
discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 114. I do not advocate in this Article for a particular “test” to be used to determine 
which terms should be disclosed through Template Notice and which should not, 
though an appropriate standard might be that notice must be given of any type of 
term that, if fully explained, would be of interest to a reasonable buyer at purchase.  
As a practical matter, the number of terms would be relatively small.  The matter may 
best be left to evolving commercial practice and judicial determinations. 
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latter case, all that would be necessary is for a telephone 
representative to tell a buyer that “the form will follow in the box.”115  
Professor Clayton Gillette, however, has raised some concern that 
merely notifying a buyer that additional terms will be on the way will 
more likely give rise to “buyer agitation than buyer enlightenment.”116  
Professor Gillette conceives of a conversation after a telephone sales 
representative informs a buyer that there will be additional terms 
included with the ordered item when it arrives going something 
along the following lines: 
“Customer:  What terms?  What are they? 
Operator:  They will be included in the box. 
Customer:  Well, wait a minute, can’t you tell me what they are?”117 
Professor Gillette argues that at this point the representative will 
have the choice of either “dron[ing] through pages of terms” or 
simply restating that the terms will be included.118  The option I 
propose—notification of additional terms with some description of 
key provisions—is a third alternative.  The “extra” information 
provided anticipates the inquisitive buyer Professor Gillette imagines, 
providing select information without inundating the buyer or putting 
an excessive burden on the seller. 
C. Standardized Terms, Blanket Assent, and Rolling Contracts 
Assent to deferred standardized terms would be more meaningful 
with Template Notice.  Template Notice corrects for the fact that 
deferred terms are separated both physically and chronologically 
from the key terms of the deal and from the moment of purchase. 
Some preliminary discussion of assent to standardized terms in 
general may prove helpful.  A logical place to start any such 
discussion is with Karl Llewellyn’s influential statement on the topic: 
Instead of thinking about ‘assent’ to boiler-plate clauses, we can 
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at 
all.  What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few 
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one 
thing more.  That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific 
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may 
                                                          
 115. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 643 
(2002). 
 116. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
679, 687 (2004). 
 117. Id. at 687 n.30. 
 118. Id. 
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have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms.119 
Llewellyn’s scholarly work has been “enormously influential with 
courts and commentators”120 and his conception of blanket assent 
“dominates contemporary judicial treatment of standard-form 
provisions.”121 
However, blanket assent should not cover quite so much in rolling 
contracts as it does in other types of standardized contracts.  In a 
typical standardized contract of the type presumably envisioned by 
Llewellyn, we might be comfortable concluding that a buyer signing a 
document is giving blanket assent to standardized terms because the 
buyer has the ability to easily see the scope of the terms to which 
assent is being given.  A buyer with a document in hand has an 
immediate ability to read it, and to the extent the buyer foregoes that 
opportunity, it may be appropriate to consider the buyer as having 
assented to unread terms in that document.  Similarly, a buyer with a 
document in hand can see how many standardized terms are in front 
of him or her (two paragraphs? fifteen pages?) and can at least get a 
sense of the scope of that to which he or she is giving assent.  
Additionally, a buyer has the option to generally skim through the 
document, and to look at the headings or for any conspicuous text.  
In such a situation, a mere check that the terms are not 
“unreasonable or indecent”122 may be enough. 
In a rolling contract, although the buyer has the ability to obtain 
the terms before purchase, he or she can only do so with some effort 
(such as contacting the manufacturer or searching the Internet).  
Similarly, the universe of terms is not so readily evident at the time of 
purchase since a buyer has little sense of the extent of standardized 
terms involved.  Template Notice addresses the differences between 
more traditional standardized contracts and rolling contracts.  By 
requiring notice of the subject matter of deferred terms at purchase, 
a buyer is given some opportunity, albeit imperfect, to understand 
what he or she is getting into.  Template Notice makes up for the 
imposition of barriers of time and effort between the buyer and the 
standardized terms in rolling contracts.123 
                                                          
 119. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960). 
 120. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1174, 1206 (1983). 
 121. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 461 (2002) (describing Llewllyn’s theory of 
“blanket assent” and recognizing its importance in modern jurisprudence). 
 122. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 119, at 370. 
 123. One scholar has noted that there may be differences in the way in which 
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Professor Barnett argues that to the extent buyers would be 
surprised to learn of additional terms, requiring sellers to notify 
buyers that additional terms will follow the purchase or order is 
“more likely to lead to manifestations of assent that reflect the 
subjective assent of the parties than a contrary rule requiring no 
disclosure.”124  As he explains, unsophisticated buyers may be unlikely 
to know that sellers are permitted to provide terms after purchase 
“and for this reason are unlikely even to ask whether such will 
occur.”125  Accordingly, providing disclosure that additional terms are 
coming may serve to make the decision to proceed with a purchase 
mesh more closely with actual assent to such deferred terms.126 
But why stop at merely requiring disclosure that some unspecified 
terms are coming?  If the goal is to make it more likely that the buyer 
really means to assent to terms the buyer may not read, it seems 
prudent to also let the buyer know what types of terms are at issue.  
Such a rule would help secure more meaningful assent.  For example, 
a party who knows that the agreement contains a “dispute resolution 
clause” and does not make an effort to seek out such a term before 
purchase can probably more appropriately be deemed to have 
assented to a reasonable arbitration clause than could a buyer who 
only knew that more terms of an unspecified type were forthcoming. 
Template Notice thus secures more meaningful assent to 
standardized deferred terms.127 
D. Assent and the Rhythm of the Rolling Contract 
Courts enforcing rolling contracts locate assent primarily at post-
purchase contract formation.  But as a practical matter, rolling 
contracts are not back-loaded in this way.  Most of the real decision-
making, especially in consumer purchases, likely occurs at purchase 
or order.  This is not to say that the contract is or should be closed to 
all new terms at purchase or order.  But given that deferred terms 
arrive when the buyer is unlikely to be focused on the transaction, 
and given that the act of keeping a good or not canceling a service is 
                                                          
terms presented on paper and terms presented on the Internet are perceived by 
potential buyers and that courts should take those differences into account.  See Juliet 
M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1332 
(2005) (comparing the buyer’s ability to see significant terms in a contract when 
flipping through a paper document versus scrolling through computer screens). 
 124. Barnett, supra note 115, at 642. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id.  
 127. A rolling contract “purist” might, at this point, argue that assent occurs only 
after the accept-or-return period lapses.  I address the question of when assent occurs 
in a rolling contract more fully in the next subsection.   See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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a fairly weak signal of assent, some mechanism is needed to limit the 
scope of deferred terms.  Given the primacy of the purchase in the 
transaction, the information provided at purchase should serve as the 
general form or skeleton of the contract—deferred terms may be 
added, but only to flesh out the details. 
Decisions of courts enforcing rolling contracts are premised on the 
idea that nothing of contractual significance, other than the making 
of an offer, occurs until the accept-or-return period, and that the 
heavy lifting of decision-making and assent occurs after purchase.128  
Given this premise, virtually any term, whether an arbitration clause 
or a provision that an additional $10,000 is owed,129 may be included 
among the deferred terms since a seller can make any offer it pleases.  
The buyer can always simply say “no” by returning the good or 
canceling the service.130  That conception, however, is not realistic 
and has been problematic from the start.  Even the examples cited by 
the ProCD court in support of its contention that transactions in 
which the “exchange of money precedes the communication of 
detailed terms” involve transactions in which some agreement was 
formed when the money was paid.131  The first example provided by 
the court was the purchase of an insurance policy.  The court 
describes these transactions as ones in which the buyer typically meets 
with an insurance agent with whom he or she discusses “the 
essentials” (such as premium amount, coverage, and so forth) and 
pays a premium.132  Although additional terms are sent later, such a 
policy typically takes effect on the payment of that first premium, as 
the ProCD court itself notes.133  Thus, at the time of purchase and 
before receipt of additional terms, “the essentials” are agreed upon 
and a contract is in force.  Insurance policies are also particularly bad 
proof of the propriety of a relatively unfettered right to add more 
terms since such policies are frequently subject to policing under the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations to prevent the imposition of 
unexpected terms.134 
                                                          
 128. See discussion supra Part I.   
 129. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that upon opening a package and finding a term that demands payment of another 
$10,000, a buyer can avoid forming a contract by simply returning the package). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1451. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the reasonable expectations doctrine and its 
application to insurance contracts). 
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The second example in ProCD, the purchase of an airplane ticket,135 
also indicates that the buyer’s decision-making is heavily front-loaded.  
The court describes a purchaser calling an airline or travel agent, 
getting a price, reserving a seat, and making a payment.  The court 
noted that there will likely be additional terms on the ticket when it 
arrives and that the use of the ticket constitutes acceptance of those 
terms.  According to Judge Easterbrook, the buyer may reject the 
terms “by canceling the reservation.”136  As with the purchase of an 
insurance policy, the purchase of the airline ticket is front-loaded.  
Decisions as to price and destination are made at purchase and, 
especially in the case of a non-refundable ticket, very little decision-
making remains to be done afterwards.  To say that what happens at 
purchase is merely part of the offer stage seems quite unrealistic. 
In fact, ProCD itself was ambivalent on when the agreement 
occurred in the software sale at issue in that case.  Although the court 
spoke in terms of acceptance occurring only after the use of the 
software,137 earlier in the opinion the court alluded to the possibility 
that some agreement was made at the time of purchase, noting that 
“one of the terms to which [the buyer] agreed by purchasing software 
is that the transaction was subject to a license.”138 
And as I have argued more fully in an earlier Article,139 even if we 
accept the argument that in a rolling contract the contract is not 
formed until after the accept-or-return period expires, some contract 
is formed at purchase or order.140  Whether or not the contract is 
technically consummated at purchase or order, the buyer is most fully 
focused on the transaction at that point.  To consider which terms 
may be deferred without reference to the circumstances of the 
purchase, as though the purchase and deferral of terms are 
independent of one another, is not appropriate. 
It is similarly inappropriate, however, to conclude that a rolling 
contract is closed to any new terms and written in stone at the time of 
purchase or order.  A typical purchaser of an airline ticket, for 
example, probably knows that there are terms beyond price and 
destination that will be printed on the back of the ticket.  Buyers as a 
                                                          
 135. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1452.   
 138. Id. at 1450. 
 139. Stephen E. Friedman, Text and Circumstance:  Warranty Disclaimers in a World of 
Rolling Contracts, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 677 (2004). 
 140. See id. at 726-27 (discussing the possibility that at the time of purchase the 
buyer has agreed to at least receive the goods or begin receiving a service and the 
seller has agreed to proceed with the sale unless the buyer takes some affirmative 
action to prevent such sale). 
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class are likely to know that the contract is not truly closed to any new 
terms at the point of purchase or order, even if they may not have 
had this understanding a few decades ago.  As one court noted in 
granting summary judgment enforcing deferred contract terms:  “if 
this case had arisen in 1985 rather than 1997, I might have a different 
ruling.”141  And from 1997 to the time of this writing, the prevalence 
of deferred terms has certainly only grown. 
What then is the rhythm of the rolling contract?  Professor Barnett 
argues that in rolling contracts the “manifestation of consent has two 
parts at two different times.”142  This conception is far more useful 
than a focus on identifying a single moment of contract formation.  
But all moments of consent are not created equal.  In a rolling 
contract we have the problem of matching assents of varying 
strengths given at varying times and in varying ways with terms of 
varying importance.143  A consumer’s attention to the purchase is 
presumably most often greatest at the time of purchase, and the act 
of making the purchase or order is a strong and clear signal of assent. 
In contrast, the act of not returning a good or canceling a service 
is, to say the least, a bit more ambiguous and can be characterized as 
“nominal assent.”  Professor Gillette, while generally favoring 
enforcement of deferred terms, notes that to speak of actions such as 
opening a box or using a product “in terms of assent is to expand the 
meaning of that phrase beyond our normal discourse” since assent 
usually requires something “more explicit than opening a box or 
using a product that is accompanied (unknown or ignored by the 
buyer) by a recitation of obligations.”144 
That what happens after the purchase or order can only 
uncomfortably be described as assent is demonstrated by language 
used by the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., v. Shute,145 a 
case in which the Court assessed the refusal by the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit to enforce a forum-selection clause on a 
                                                          
 141. See M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 310 
(Wash. 2000) (quoting statement of the trial court judge in the proceeding below). 
 142. Barnett, supra note 115, at 641. 
 143. The time factor thus exacerbates what Professor David Slawson identified, 
before the emergence of rolling contracts, as a flaw in Llewellyn’s theory of assent.  
See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract:  The Transformation of Contracts Law 
by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 37 (1984) (explaining that Llewellyn’s 
conception ignores “the transactional context.  It rests on the implicit assumption 
that ‘specific assent’ and ‘blanket assent’ are the same and are distributed among 
different kinds of terms in the same way regardless of the context of the transaction.  
This is certainly not the fact”). 
 144. Gillette, supra note 116, at 681. 
 145. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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passenger cruise line ticket.146  Shute, which is one of the cases cited in 
ProCD as support for the proposition that payment of money often 
precedes full disclosure of terms,147 articulated a test for whether to 
enforce choice of forum provisions on passenger cruise line tickets.  
Part of that test involves assessing whether the clause is fundamentally 
fair.  The Court found that the provision at issue was fundamentally 
fair since there was no evidence that the cruise line “obtained [the 
passengers’] accession to the forum clause by fraud or 
overreaching.”148  Even as the Court approved the forum selection 
clause, the Court apparently found itself unable to actually use the 
word “agreement” or “assent” to describe the manner in which the 
term became binding.  Instead, the court settled on “accession.”  
That word choice is telling.  At some level “accession” is a synonym 
for agreement, but the example used by a leading legal dictionary to 
illustrate the meaning is instructive:  “the family’s accession to the 
kidnapper’s demands.”149  Accession thus carries a connotation of 
“reluctantly giving into demands,” as opposed to voluntary and 
meaningful assent.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has used the word 
“accession” to carry just that connotation in other contexts as well.150 
Even if a buyer understands that a return period is available, a 
seller’s marketing practices may diminish the buyer’s appreciation 
that the return period includes an opportunity to review contract 
terms.  In Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp.,151 the court refused to 
enforce an arbitration provision included inside the box of a 
computer ordered over the telephone.152  The court distinguished 
ProCD and other cases that enforced terms in rolling contracts 
because, although the seller in Defontes did offer a “total satisfaction 
[return] policy,” the policy was not sufficiently specific in informing 
the buyer that the computer could be returned based on the buyer’s 
“unwillingness to comply with the terms” included inside the box.153  
In other words, the buyer might have believed that he had the right 
to consider and reject the computer, but not the contract terms.154 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 589. 
 147. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).   
 148. Shute, 499 U.S. at 595. 
 149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (8th ed. 2004). 
 150. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 767 n.12 
(1984) (discussing “accession to the demands of the distributors”); see also Haynes v. 
State of Wash., 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963) (describing “accession to police demands”). 
 151. No. C.A. PC-03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004). 
 152. Id. at *7. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(emphasizing that “acceptance of an offer differs from acceptance of goods after 
delivery”). 
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Despite the characterization of rolling contracts by courts 
enforcing them, the rhythm of the rolling contract is actually that of a 
front-loaded transaction in which the most significant decision-
making with respect to the good or service and its terms occurs at 
purchase or order.  Given this structure, Template Notice serves a 
number of useful purposes:  it moves some information to a moment 
of focused assent and decision-making and it limits the scope of terms 
that will be deemed to have been agreed to through nominal assent.  
Perhaps most fundamentally, it uses the information provided at 
purchase as the basic structure for the overall contract.  As I discuss 
later, this approach is already being used in the analogous context of 
assessing whether terms may be added pursuant to “change in terms” 
provisions in credit card agreements.155 
E. Clarifying Contractual Significance 
Ambiguity over the contractual significance of documents and 
actions that come after the purchase or order is inherent in rolling 
contracts.  Template Notice would help resolve that ambiguity by 
bridging the separation between the time and manner in which the 
key terms of a rolling contract are presented and the time and 
manner in which the standardized terms are presented. 
The obviousness of the contractual nature of a document is 
relevant to the enforceability of standardized terms.  For example, 
Section 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that, 
with some exceptions, signing or otherwise assenting to a writing 
constitutes assent to all the terms contained in the writing, whether 
or not these terms are read.156  Comment d to Section 211 qualifies 
that general rule. The comment notes that some documents may 
serve both contractual and other non-contractual purposes.  When 
the party signing a document has reason to understand that such a 
document is obviously contractual in nature (the comment gives 
warehouse receipts and insurance policies as two examples of 
documents whose contractual nature is generally obvious), that party 
will likely be bound by the contract provisions contained therein.157  
However, the contractual nature of what might be called “dual use” 
documents is less clear.  For instance, the comment indicates that 
                                                          
 155. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (providing that as long 
as requirements of the section are met, a party “sign[ing] or otherwise manifest[ing] 
assent to a writing . . . adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to 
the terms included in the writing”). 
 157. Id. § 211 cmt. d. 
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baggage checks and parking lot tickets may simply appear to be 
identification tokens.158  Buyers who lack reason to know of the 
contractual nature of these documents are not bound by terms 
printed on them.159  The comment seems positively prescient in 
anticipating rolling contracts when it notes that “[d]ocuments such as 
invoices, instructions for use, and the like, delivered after a contract is 
made, may raise similar problems.”160  It seems the drafters of the 
Restatement understood that anything coming to a buyer after 
purchase is prone to give rise to confusion as to its contractual 
nature. 
Case law indicates some broadening of the importance of 
“contractual significance” in contracts formed in non-traditional 
ways.  In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,161 the court refused to 
enforce purported contract terms on a web site.162  A web site may 
display all types of information, some of which is contractual in 
nature and some of which is not.  The Second Circuit in Specht used a 
test akin to comment d, although it did not make reference to 
Section 211 in reaching its decision.  Persons downloading the 
software at issue in Specht saw on their computers a screen containing 
praise for the software and a “Download” button at the bottom of the 
screen.  To reach the actual license terms at issue, a user would have 
to have scrolled down on the screen.  The court found that the 
license was not binding since a reasonably prudent person 
downloading the software would not “have known of the existence of 
license terms.”163  Instead, the plaintiffs’ “apparent manifestation of 
consent was to terms contained in a document whose contractual 
nature was not obvious.”164 
Although Specht did not involve a rolling contract, many of the 
issues it raised are equally relevant to rolling contracts.  A key point in 
Specht was that it really did not matter how clear the contract terms 
were since Internet users had no reason to be on the look-out for 
them.  While the position of the scroll bar gave some indication that 
there may have been more text, that indication was insufficient notice 
of the contractual nature of such text.165  In a rolling contract, the 
                                                          
 158. Id.; see also Magliozzi v. P & T Container Serv. Co., Inc., 614 N.E.2d 690, 692 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (indicating that a “trash pickup ticket” was not sufficiently 
contractual in nature for term on its reverse side to be binding). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. d. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added). 
 161. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 162. Id. at 31. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 165. Id. at 31-32. 
FRIEDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/28/2006  4:29:41 PM 
2006] IMPROVING THE ROLLING CONTRACT 31 
clarity of the text of the deferred terms is similarly of no consequence 
if a buyer has insufficient reason to suspect that contract terms he or 
she can do something about are contained on the pieces of paper 
received after purchase. 
In Campbell v. General Dynamics Government Systems Corp.,166 the court 
assessed the enforceability of an arbitration provision that was part of 
a new dispute resolution policy an employer had purported to 
introduce.  The president of the company had sent all employees an 
e-mail that, among other things, described the policy.  The e-mail 
urged employees to review the “enclosed materials”—a reference to 
the two hypertext links in the e-mail (one to a brochure describing 
the policy and one to a handbook containing the full policy).167 
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the arbitration 
provision was not enforceable, at least as to the relevant federal claim 
at issue.168  The court concluded after examining the “totality of the 
circumstances,” including “the method, content, and context of the 
communication,” that the employees were not given minimally 
sufficient notice that the new policy was a “contractual instrument,” 
the terms of which would be made binding by an employee’s 
continued employment with the company.169  The court noted that 
although e-mail was widely used at the company and was a preferred 
method of communication in general, it was not ordinarily used by 
the company for personnel matters or to convey contract terms.170  
Thus, even though the text of the e-mail announced a new policy, the 
receipt of the e-mail did not “raise a red flag vivid enough” to let the 
employees anticipate a “legally significant alteration” to employment 
terms.171  The court suggested that requiring employees to 
affirmatively respond to the e-mail by clicking a box on the screen 
would have helped put employees on notice of the contractual nature 
of the e-mail and linked documents.172 
The court also looked to the “content of the communication,” 
which consisted of the text of the e-mail and the documents available 
by hyperlink.  The court focused on the e-mail text, since such a focus 
mirrored the way in which the employer had presented the 
                                                          
 166. 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 167. Id. at 548. 
 168. Id. at 555.  The narrow question was actually whether the company’s 
communications had provided employees with sufficient notice such that their claims 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2004), could be 
subject to arbitration.   Id. 
 169. Id. at 559. 
 170. Id. at 556. 
 171. Id. at 557. 
 172. Id. at 556-57. 
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communication.  The text contained a “fundamental flaw”—it “did 
not state directly that the Policy contained an arbitration provision 
that was meant to effect a waiver of an employee’s right to access a 
judicial forum.”173  If anything, the language of the e-mail downplayed 
the significance of the policy terms and their binding nature.174  
While explicitness was not absolutely required, it “would have gone a 
long way toward meeting the employer’s burden.”175 
An analogy can be made between the e-mail in Campbell and the 
purchase phase of a rolling contract.  Both serve to frame the 
transaction and both serve, in essence, as the gateway to the 
remainder of the contract.  Both can either highlight or downplay 
the contractual significance of what is to come.   Just as the e-mail in 
Campbell differed significantly in format from the material in the 
hypertext link, the pre-purchase disclosure in a rolling contract 
differs in format from the manner in which deferred terms are 
presented.  The fundamental flaw in Campbell of failing to include 
notice of the arbitration provision in the text of the e-mail is 
replicated by a failure to include a similar notice at purchase in a 
rolling contract. 
Although neither Specht nor Campbell involved rolling contracts, 
one court has applied the rationale of those cases to a rolling 
contract.  In Defontes v. Dell Computers Corp.,176 a case already 
discussed,177 the court refused to enforce an arbitration provision that 
had been included inside the box of a computer ordered over the 
telephone.  Defontes is significant in that it refused to enforce a rolling 
contract for a reason other than that a contract was formed at 
purchase or order.178  Instead, the Defontes court refused to enforce 
the contract based on an application of the rationale of Specht. 
The Defontes court distinguished ProCD and other cases that had 
enforced deferred terms.  The key distinction was that, although the 
seller offered a “total satisfaction policy” pursuant to which the 
purchased computer could be returned, the policy was not 
sufficiently specific in informing the buyer that the computer could 
be returned based on the buyer’s “unwillingness to comply with the 
terms” inside the box.179  The court noted that the “underlying 
reasoning of the Specht decision is particularly poignant to this 
                                                          
 173. Id. at 557. 
 174. Id. at 557-58. 
 175. Id. at 557. 
 176. No. C.A. PC-03-2636, 2004 WL 253560 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004). 
 177. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 178. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
 179. 2004 WL 253560,  at *7. 
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issue.”180  According to the court, in Specht, the decision hinged on 
whether a reasonable Internet user would have known of the 
existence of the purported terms of the agreement.  The court 
employed the “same logic,” determining that the relevant question in 
Defontes should be whether a reasonable purchaser would have known 
that returning the computer would have constituted rejection of 
those terms.  The court held that a reasonable purchaser would not 
have known this.181 
Defontes implicitly added another requirement to awareness of the 
contractual nature of a document:  it is not enough that a buyer 
understand that a document is contractual in nature.  The buyer 
must also understand that the contract terms at issue are “live”—that 
is, terms the buyer can still do something about by returning the 
product or canceling the service.  Such a requirement is particularly 
important in rolling contracts where a buyer is far more likely to be 
presented with something referenced as “terms and conditions” than 
with something referenced as “proposed terms and conditions.” 
In enhancing the obviousness of contractual significance, the sole 
focus should not be on the document in which the deferred terms 
are ultimately presented.  It is easy enough for a seller to include a 
document containing only contract terms (excluding any instructions 
or other information that might distract from the contractual nature 
of the document) inside the shipping box.  The seller could even 
print “THIS IS A CONTRACT” on the front for good measure. 
Such a solution misses the point.  It is not the particular form or 
appearance of the document on which the deferred terms are found 
that matters.  What matters is whether the buyer will have sufficient 
reason to locate and read the document in the first place and to 
understand that the statement of “terms” is actually a statement of 
“proposed terms” which the buyer may accept or reject. 
The segregation of boilerplate terms from key terms (such as price 
and product description) warrants special scrutiny.  That separation, 
both in method and time, weakens a reasonable purchaser’s 
perception of the contractual significance of post-purchase 
documents and actions.  In other words, the purchase or order gives 
rise to a sort of “mini” course of performance,182 establishing the way 
                                                          
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. A course of performance, at least under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
exists when a contract “involves repeated occasions for performance by either party 
with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it 
by the other.”  U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (2005).  A course of performance “accepted or 
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the 
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in which terms are presented and accepted (or at the very least, 
providing a benchmark).  In a traditional agreement with 
standardized terms, those terms are presented in the same way and at 
the same time as the key terms and all such terms are accepted by a 
signature or a purchase.  In a rolling contract, however, key terms are 
likely presented in the context of the purchase or order and are 
presented orally or, if in writing, colloquially, before the buyer has 
taken possession of the goods or begun using a service.  These key 
terms are typically accepted by the purchase or order.  In contrast, 
the agreement’s standardized terms are likely presented in densely 
written legalese and provided after the buyer takes possession of a 
purchased item or begins using a service.  They are accepted by 
keeping the good or continuing with the service. 
The break between key terms and standardized terms is typically so 
complete that the “Terms and Conditions” provided after the 
purchase or order are invariably not really the “Terms and 
Conditions” of the contract since they are quite unlikely to include 
such terms as product description or purchase price.  Thus, the 
presentation of “pure” boilerplate, unadulterated by what a buyer 
might actually consider relevant contract terms, should be subject to 
special scrutiny.  In other words, a buyer may only register “contract 
terms about which I can do something,” when the buyer sees key 
terms, such as price. 
The divide between the key terms and the standardized terms is 
quite large in rolling contracts.  Template Notice provides a way of 
reducing that divide.  It presents the deferred terms, albeit in an 
abbreviated form, at the time of purchase and in the same context as 
the key terms.  It also makes clearer that deferred terms are not final 
but may be rejected by returning the product or canceling the 
service.183  Finally, Template Notice would make clearer, in a larger 
sense, that the transaction is not complete at the purchase or order 
and that what is received and what happens afterwards may be 
“contractual in nature.” 
                                                          
agreement.”  Id. 
 183. Template Notice meets the objection of Defontes more squarely by putting a 
buyer on much stronger notice from the outset of the transaction that the act of 
keeping the goods will constitute acceptance of those terms and that the buyer does 
have the right to avoid the transaction if dissatisfied with the contract terms. 
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IV. BEYOND CONTRACT FORMATION:  ADAPTING DOCTRINES USED TO 
ASSESS STANDARDIZED TERMS TO ROLLING CONTRACTS 
The focus on the mechanics of contract formation that has largely 
dominated the analysis of rolling contracts to date has effectively 
sidelined other tools that might be used to assess the deferral of 
terms.  In this Section, I discuss unconscionability and reasonable 
expectations.  For each, I provide an overview, describe how the 
doctrine has been marginalized by courts assessing rolling contracts, 
and propose how these doctrines could be applied to the deferral of 
terms.  Were courts to apply these doctrines, it would not spell doom 
for rolling contracts.  It would instead result in the improvement of 
the rolling contract through the addition of Template Notice to these 
transactions. 
A. Unconscionability184 
1. Overview of unconscionability 
A term or a contract may be deemed unenforceable because it is 
unconscionable under both the common law185 and the Uniform 
Commercial Code.186  Unconscionability “has generally been 
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part 
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”187 
Unconscionability includes both a procedural aspect, which focuses 
on “deficiencies in the contract formation process,”188 and a 
substantive aspect, which focuses on whether the challenged contract 
or term is “unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side.”189  A party 
seeking to establish unconscionability must generally demonstrate 
both aspects,190 although not necessarily to the same degree (that is, 
                                                          
 184. Much of what was said in the previous part of this Article is relevant here, as 
well, since Karl Llewellyn’s analysis of assent to standardized terms provides the 
foundation for unconscionability.  See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §4.28 (3d 
ed. 1999) (noting that Llewellyn is credited with the authorship of U.C.C. § 2-302 (1) 
(2005)). 
 185. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
 186. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005). 
 187. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449. 
 188. Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 744 (Md. 2005) (quoting 8 
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18.10 (4th ed. 1998)). 
 189. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 190. See, e.g., Trend Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411, 415 (Ct. 
App. 2005) (ruling that both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be 
present, but that the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less 
evidence of procedural unconscionability is required); Clark v. DaimlerChrysler 
Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (“In order for a contract or 
FRIEDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER 8/28/2006  4:29:41 PM 
36 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1 
pursuant to a “sliding scale” approach, the “more substantively 
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural 
unconscionability is required and vice versa”).191  A few courts appear 
to have been satisfied with substantive unconscionability alone, even 
in the absence of procedural unconscionability.192 
2. Formation and unconscionability:  judicial reluctance to the serious 
evaluation of rolling contracts for procedural unconscionability 
Courts have generally been content to let the discussion of contract 
formation and of the practical difficulties of complete pre-purchase 
disclosure in ProCD and Hill insulate the deferral of terms from 
claims of procedural unconscionability.  Prior to ProCD, at least two 
courts raised concerns (albeit in the context of a discussion of 
whether terms should become part of a contract under the U.C.C.’s 
“battle of the forms” provision)193 about the structure of rolling 
contracts, noting that the time and energy a buyer invests in a 
purchase might work as a strong disincentive for the buyer to exercise 
a right to return a purchased item.194 
Unfortunately, exploration of this line of analysis seems to have 
largely ended after ProCD and Hill.  For instance, in Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., decided shortly after Hill, the court rejected a claim that a 
contract involving deferred terms was a contract of adhesion and 
indicated that deferred terms should be treated like any other type of 
term: 
                                                          
contract provision to be considered unconscionable, both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability must be present.”); see also Jeffrey Mining Prod., L.P. v. 
Left Fork Mining Co., 758 N.E.2d 1173, 1180-81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (stating that 
“[t]he unconscionability doctrine consists of two prongs:  (1) substantive 
unconscionability . . . and (2) procedural unconscionability”). 
 191. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 
2000).  
 192. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Ariz. 1995) 
(holding that despite the fact that “perhaps a majority” of courts have held that there 
must be at least some quantum of both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, a claim of unconscionability can be established under Arizona’s 
version of the U.C.C. with a showing of “substantive unconscionability alone”); 
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (App. Div. 1998) (holding 
that procedural unconscionability is not always required for a finding of 
unconscionability). 
 193. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2005). 
 194. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(stating that the vendor may have been relying on the purchaser’s investment in time 
and energy in reaching a point in the transaction so as to prevent him from 
returning the item); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 
766 (D. Ariz. 1993) (stating that “purchasers often invest considerable time and 
money before ordering goods, and, therefore, are somewhat less likely to return 
goods once they arrive”). 
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While returning the goods to avoid contract formation entails 
affirmative action . . . and even some expense, this may be seen as a 
trade-off for the convenience and savings for which the consumer 
opted [by choosing to avoid on-site retail shopping].  That a 
consumer does not read the agreement or thereafter claims he or 
she failed to understand or appreciate some term does not 
invalidate the contract any more than such claim would undo a 
contract formed under other circumstances.195 
In other words, rolling contracts are to be treated no differently than 
other types of standardized contracts. 
Hill and ProCD seem to have put the “stamp of approval” on 
deferred terms even with respect to claims of procedural 
unconscionability (despite the fact that the issue of unconscionability 
was not raised in either of those cases).196  For instance, in O’Quin v. 
Verizon Wireless,197 the court enforced an arbitration clause in a terms 
and conditions pamphlet inside the packaging of a purchased 
telephone handset.198  The court first noted that the provision was a 
part of the agreement, because opinions like Hill found nothing 
“overwhelmingly objectionable in the ‘money now, terms later’ 
approach to sales of consumer goods.”199  Later in the opinion, the 
court rejected a claim of procedural unconscionability, noting (again 
with a citation to Hill) that courts have “countenanced some 
modicum of adhesionary terms, or evidence of procedural 
unconscionability in contract formation, in the name of economic 
efficiency.”200 
Similarly, in Stenzel v. Dell Inc.,201 the court rejected a claim that an 
arbitration agreement sent after a computer had been purchased was 
unconscionable.  In response to the purchasers’ claim that the 
contract was procedurally unconscionable because it had not been 
freely negotiated, the court stated that there was “substantial case law 
on point to the contrary.”202  The first case the court cited for this 
proposition was Hill and the remaining citations were to cases 
following the reasoning of Hill on contract formation.203 
                                                          
 195. 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (App. Div. 1998). 
 196. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (pointing 
out that no claim of unconscionability was asserted); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147  (7th Cir. 1997) (unconscionability not discussed in the opinion). 
 197. 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003). 
 198. Id. at 516. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 517. 
 201. No. CIV-03-323, 2004 WL 1433657 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2004). 
 202. Id. at *3. 
 203. Id. 
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The unconscionability of the deferral of terms was also apparently 
raised in M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp.,204 but the 
court refused the invitation to address the issue fully.  Mortenson 
involved a limitation on consequential damages included as part of a 
shrinkwrap license that had not been presented to the buyer until 
after the purchased software had been ordered.205  The purchaser 
challenged the limitation as procedurally unconscionable, arguing 
that “the license terms were never presented to [the purchaser] in a 
contractually meaningfully way,”206 an apparent reference to the fact 
that the license terms were not discussed or disclosed at the time of 
purchase.  The court addressed the issue, however, by simply looking 
to factors that are more conventionally relevant to claims of 
procedural unconscionability:  the provisions were not in fine print, 
the license was printed in capital letters on the diskette pouches and 
in the instruction manuals, and the buyer was a sophisticated 
purchaser.207  The court simply did not address whether the deferral 
of the terms itself was procedurally unconscionable.  This failure on 
the part of the court was probably due to the fact that the court had 
already, in a lengthy discussion, endorsed the deferral of terms with a 
return option as a valid way in which to form contracts.208  In essence, 
the contract formation discussion took the wind out of the 
unconscionability argument. 
3. Applying unconscionability to the deferral of terms 
That the mechanics of offer and acceptance can be made to “work” 
in rolling contracts should not be the end of the analysis.  Under 
both the U.C.C. and the common law, the unconscionability analysis 
assumes that a contract has been formed209—the fact of formation 
should merely begin the analysis.  Procedural unconscionability is not 
limited to offer and acceptance, but instead “broadly encompasses a 
whole host of circumstances surrounding contract execution.”210 
Key indicators of procedural unconscionability are whether there is 
a lack of voluntariness or a lack of knowledge of the provisions at 
                                                          
 204. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000). 
 205. Id. at 315. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 311-14.  
 209. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005) (providing that a court is to determine whether 
contract or provision of contract was unconscionable “at the time [the contract] was 
made”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (explaining that the 
court should assess unconscionability as of “the time the contract is made”).   
 210. Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary:  U.C.C. Article 2 and the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N. M. L. REV. 359, 365 (2001). 
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issue.211  Both of these indicators are potentially implicated in rolling 
contracts as they are presently structured.  The decision to accept 
deferred terms may simply reflect the investment of time and energy 
in the transaction which creates an artificial pressure to proceed with 
the transaction.  A buyer who might have balked at a particular 
provision presented before purchase may be willing to accept that 
same provision once the buyer becomes embroiled in the 
transaction.212 
Lack of knowledge, too, is potentially at issue in rolling contracts.  
Among the factors considered in assessing procedural 
unconscionability is whether a transaction involves “the hiding of 
clauses which are disadvantageous to one party in a mass of fine print 
trivia or in places which are inconspicuous to the party signing the 
contract.”213  But just as within a single document there are places in 
which terms may be placed to make them less obvious, the same is 
true of the rhythm of an overall transaction.  That is, it may be 
possible to minimize a term’s impact by presenting it at a time other 
than purchase.  The post-purchase period may be the equivalent of a 
single document’s fine print.214 
A transaction may be structured so that the main terms simply 
overpower the standardized terms and minimize awareness of the 
standardized terms.  One arguably analogous case is John Deere Leasing 
Co. v. Blubaugh.215  In Blubaugh, the court found a lease provision 
unconscionable.216  The provision at issue was on the back side of the 
lease in “very light-colored, fine print.”217  Because the paper was thin, 
the darker print from the front page was able “to show through to the 
back, making it difficult to see the fine print.”218  The resulting 
difficulty in reading the standardized terms was among the factors 
that led the court to find procedural unconscionability.219  In 
Blubaugh, the key terms overwhelmed the standardized terms.  A 
similar state of affairs exists in rolling contracts, where the front-
                                                          
 211. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986). 
 212. See discussion of cognitive dissonance and the endowment effect, supra Part 
III.B.1. 
 213. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Kan. 1976). 
 214. Cf. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 121, at 479 (observing that sellers doing 
business over the Internet have “avenues for tinkering with the presentation format 
of their electronic boilerplate” to discourage consumers from actually reading the 
terms). 
 215. 636 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Kan. 1986). 
 216. Id. at 1575. 
 217. Id. at 1571. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1574. 
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loaded nature of the transaction serves to maximize what comes at 
purchase and minimize what comes later. 
Template Notice enhances both voluntariness and knowledge in 
rolling contracts.  Template Notice provides for disclosure of the 
substance of terms at a time when attention is likely being paid to the 
transaction and choice can be made freely, unencumbered by 
concerns over time and expense that have already been sunk into the 
transaction. 
Additionally, a buyer proceeding with a transaction after receiving 
notice of the types of terms being deferred has willingly and 
knowingly put herself in the position of receiving full disclosure of 
the precise text of the terms only after purchase or order.  The initial 
decision to proceed with the transaction is thus significantly better 
informed than it would have been had there been no notice of 
additional terms or only notice that some unspecified additional 
terms would be forthcoming. 
In short, the pressure of procedural unconscionability analysis 
should result in sellers adopting Template Notice to avoid their 
transactions being deemed procedurally unconscionable, a finding 
that would put the substance of the terms under a scrutiny that they 
might otherwise escape.  Fully exposing the current structure of 
rolling contracts (without Template Notice) to unconscionability 
analysis might result in some courts determining that rolling 
contracts are, as a class, sufficiently suspect that deferred terms be 
deemed unenforceable even if substantive unconscionability is 
present only to a comparatively small degree.220  Sellers would thus 
face the choice of either accepting this heightened scrutiny of 
deferred terms or adopting Template Notice to alleviate judicial 
concern over the deferral of terms. 
B. Reasonable Expectations 
1.  Overview of reasonable expectations 
The reasonable expectations doctrine has two sources.  It flows 
both from Section 211(3) of the Restatement and from judicial 
opinions assessing terms in insurance agreements.  Some argue that 
these two strands have essentially merged.221 
                                                          
 220. Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the 
same extent.  A larger degree of procedural unconscionability might offset a lesser 
degree of substantive unconscionability, and vice versa.  See discussion supra Part 
IV.A.1. 
 221. See, e.g., Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. 
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Section 211(3) reflects Karl Llewellyn’s conception of assent to 
standardized terms.222  It provides that generally signing or otherwise 
assenting to a writing constitutes assent to all the terms contained in 
the writing, whether or not these terms are read.223  An exception to 
that general rule is provided in subsection (3), which states that 
“where the other party has reason to believe that the party 
manifesting . . . assent would not do so if he knew that the writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not a part of the 
agreement.”224  However, parties to a contract “are not bound to 
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable 
expectations.”225  Along with unconscionability, Section 211(3) 
represents one of the “most prominent judicial avenues” for dealing 
with standardized terms.226 
Similarly, the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been 
invoked by courts in the context of insurance agreements, and 
protects against assent being deemed to have been given to terms 
that, even if not unconscionable, are still beyond the reasonable 
expectations of a party to the contract.227  Professor Keeton, who first 
identified reasonable expectations as a principle underlying many 
cases involving insurance coverage (although he noted that it 
“surely . . . applies in other contexts as well”),228 described it as 
follows:  “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will 
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions 
would have negated those expectations.”229  As a corollary, “insurers 
ought not to be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions from 
coverage that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a 
policyholder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of 
coverage involved.”230 
                                                          
REV. 139, 152 (2005) (treating the Restatement’s definition of unenforceable terms 
as merging into reasonable expectations). 
 222. See Rakoff, supra note 120, at 1199 (noting that Section 211 “reflects 
[Llewellyn’s] work, not just in its black-letter formulations, but in almost every 
paragraph of its commentary as well”). 
 223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 211(1) (1981) (providing that as long 
as the requirements of this section are met, a party “sign[ing] or otherwise 
manifest[ing] assent to a writing . . . adopts the writing as an integrated agreement 
with respect to the terms included in the writing”). 
 224. Id. § 211(3). 
 225. Id. § 211 cmt. f. 
 226. Hillman, supra note 4, at 748. 
 227. For a brief summary of the reasonable expectations doctrine, see Burnham, 
supra note 221, at 153-56. 
 228. Keeton, supra note 83, at 967. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 968. 
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Although some jurisdictions have not adopted the reasonable 
expectations doctrine,231 numerous other courts have adopted a 
variety of versions of the doctrine.  Some courts have adopted 
reasonable expectations merely as a form of contra proferentem, 
deferring to the reasonable expectations of the insured only if the 
policy is ambiguous,232 and others have applied it only where the 
agreement “contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if the fine print 
purports to take away what is written in large print.”233  In a third 
variation, referred to by one commentator as the “whole transaction” 
approach, reasonable expectations are enforced even if such 
expectations are created by insurers’ “marketing patterns and general 
practice,” and not just if such expectations are created by the 
language of the agreement.234 
2. Implicit rejection of the application of reasonable expectations to the 
deferral of terms 
The application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to the 
deferral of terms was, at least arguably, implicitly rejected in dicta in 
ProCD.235  After discussing the term at issue that restricted the use of 
the purchased database to non-commercial uses, the court went on to 
note that:  “Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package 
to find an insert saying ‘you owe us an extra $10,000’ and the seller 
files suit to collect.”236  The simplest distinction between the license 
term and the $10,000 term is that while the buyer in ProCD should 
                                                          
 231. See, e.g., Ryals v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 803, 805 (Idaho 2000) 
(noting that the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the concept of reasonable 
expectations); Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Mich. 2003) 
(rejecting doctrine of reasonable expectations under Michigan law).  See generally 
Paul N. Farquhason, Reasonable Expectations, in 1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 5.3(d)(1) (David Leitner et al. eds., 2002) (discussing 
jurisdictions not accepting reasonable expectations); Roger C. Henderson, The 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST L. J. 
823, 834-38 (1990) (categorizing the jurisdictions that have not explicitly recognized 
reasonable expectations and describing the specific differences among them). 
 232. See, e.g., Tsadilas v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Ct. 
2004) (holding that because the arbitration provision added to the contract was 
clear, it was not necessary to ask about the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations), appeal 
denied, 832 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2005).  See generally Thomas J. Rueter & Joshua H. 
Roberts, Pennsylvania’s Reasonable Expectations Doctrine:  The Third Circuit’s Perspective, 
45 VILL. L. REV. 581, 586-87 (2000) (describing opinions taking the contra proferentem 
approach). 
 233. Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982).  
See generally Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1469-72 (1989) (collecting and describing other 
cases adopting a similar approach). 
 234. Ware, supra note 233, at 1472-73. 
 235. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 236. Id. at 1452. 
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reasonably have expected the license term, he could not have 
reasonably expected a gigantic price increase.  Instead of 
distinguishing the license term from the $10,000 term on the basis of 
reasonable expectations, however, the court focused on contract 
formation as the answer to the dilemma, noting that a buyer seeing 
the demand for $10,000 could “prevent formation of the contract by 
returning the package.”237 
Reasonable expectations as a tool to police the deferral of terms 
was also implicitly rejected in Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet 
Gateway.238  Davidson involved the enforceability of license terms that 
were referenced on the packaging of the purchased software and 
were visible only after purchase.239  Although the buyers framed their 
argument in terms of procedural unconscionability and a claim that 
the contract was one of adhesion, the language they used was that of 
reasonable expectations: 
Defendants argue that the contract is adhesive because it fails to 
square with the reasonable expectations of the parties, as no 
average member of the public would expect to pay $49.99 for a 
game and then be unable to use it when he or she gets home.  
Defendants also argue that no reasonable person would expect to 
be barred from installing the game he just bought unless he or she 
is forced to comply with an [End User License Agreement].240 
The court rejected the argument without discussing reasonable 
expectations.241 
3. Applying reasonable expectations to the deferral of terms 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has largely been restricted 
to the assessment of insurance agreements, but it has been used in 
other contexts as well.242  When Professor Keeton articulated the 
concept of reasonable expectations he stated that the doctrine has 
applicability beyond the insurance context.243  The rolling contract is 
an appropriate candidate for reasonable expectations.  Rolling 
contracts share an important characteristic with insurance 
                                                          
 237. Id. 
 238. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d, Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 
F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 239. Id. at 1169-70. 
 240. Id. at 1179. 
 241. Id. at 1178-80. 
 242. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1257 n.199 (2003) (collecting cases from 
contexts other than insurance in which the reasonable expectations doctrine was 
applied). 
 243. See Keeton, supra note 83, at 967. 
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contracts—they both involve a lapse of time between payment and 
receipt of terms.  This characteristic of insurance contracts is one of 
the factors that led Professor Keeton to argue that insurance law 
ought to embrace reasonable expectations.  That is, when Professor 
Keeton first articulated the concept of reasonable expectations he 
was not just describing; he was also prescribing.244  Professor Keeton 
thought that insurance law ought to embrace reasonable 
expectations because the delay between signing an insurance 
agreement (and paying a first premium) and the receipt of the 
detailed policy is a “factor enhancing the policy holder’s 
disinclination to read his policy carefully or even to read it at all.”245  
Keeton’s description of insurance contracts applies equally well to 
rolling contracts where the purchase precedes full disclosure of 
standardized terms.  In fact, insurance agreements are the first 
example given in ProCD in support of the proposition that 
transactions in which money precedes detailed terms are common.246 
Of course, concluding that the reasonable expectations doctrine 
should be applied to rolling contracts does not answer the question 
of precisely how the doctrine should be applied.  Given the 
functional primacy of the purchase in rolling contracts,247 information 
at purchase should frame the expectations of buyers in rolling 
contracts.  This emphasis on information presented at purchase 
reflects Professor Keeton’s view that a seller wishing to put a buyer on 
sufficient notice of what would otherwise be an unexpected term 
should do so “by calling it to the attention of a policyholder at the 
time of contracting.”248  In the modified version of reasonable 
expectations for assessing the deferral of terms that I propose, the 
key inquiry would be whether, given the context of the transaction 
and the information provided at purchase, a buyer would reasonably 
think a transaction was open or closed to a particular type of term.  It 
might be that some terms should be so expected under the 
circumstances (as was arguably true of the provision in ProCD) that a 
buyer would reasonably expect that type of provision.  For the 
                                                          
 244. See id. (noting that insurance law is moving in the direction of reasonable 
expectations and that reasonable expectations is “a principle that insurance law 
ought to embrace”). 
 245. Id. at 968. 
 246. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).  Additionally, 
ProCD references Section 211, cmt. a of the Restatement as support for the 
proposition that standardized terms can be useful.  Id.  And Professor Hillman, who 
is generally supportive of rolling contracts, seems to consider Section 211 applicable 
to rolling contracts, as well.  Hillman, supra note 4, at 757. 
 247. See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 248. Keeton, supra note 83, at 968. 
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majority of terms, however, and especially in consumer purchases, 
Template Notice could be quite useful in helping to define the scope 
of what is and is not an expected type of provision.249  Sellers could 
still defer terms, but only those that would “fill in the blanks.”  Terms 
could not be dropped in “out of the blue.”250 
Although courts generally have resisted applying reasonable 
expectations to the deferral of terms,251 there is some indication of 
the beginning of judicial unease with permitting sellers to add terms 
virtually without limitation.  The response has been along the lines 
that I propose, with courts looking to the information provided at 
purchase or order to establish the form of the transaction and 
permitting only those terms that fill out the details.  For instance, in 
Reedy v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,252 the court refused to enforce an 
arbitration agreement that had not been provided at the time of 
purchase.253  Reedy involved the sale of “personal seat licenses” 
guaranteeing season ticket holders the ability to obtain a seat in a 
specific area of a sports stadium.254  After making their initial 
payment, purchasers received a document with contract terms, 
including an arbitration provision.255  Two of the defendants argued 
that the buyers of the seat licenses were on notice that there would be 
additional contract terms after purchase.256  These defendants argued 
that the brochure, which was sent to prospective buyers, included a 
section of rules and regulations stating that after the buyers sent in 
the first installment of the purchase price, a contract would be 
forthcoming, and this “contract [would] outline all terms and 
conditions of the [seat license] agreement.”257  The court rejected the 
defendants’ argument, noting that the statement in the rules and 
regulations did not put the buyers on notice of the arbitration 
                                                          
 249. As I indicated earlier, some provisions will be so inconsequential that no 
Template Notice of them need be given.  See discussion supra Part III.B.3.  Put 
another way, a buyer probably reasonably expects in every transaction some relatively 
minor contract terms. 
 250. I should clarify that Template Notice would only provide notice of reasonable 
terms of the types identified in a Template Notice disclosure.  That is, if Template 
Notice indicated deferral of an arbitration provision, a buyer would be on notice of a 
typical arbitration provision, but not an unduly oppressive one.  Template Notice 
would not immunize such oppressive terms from scrutiny—such unusual terms 
would have to be fully and meaningfully disclosed at purchase to have the possibility 
of being effective. 
 251. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. 
 252. 758 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio App. Ct. 2001). 
 253. Id. at 680-81. 
 254. Id. at 680. 
 255. Id. at 681. 
 256. Id. at 684. 
 257. Id. 
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provision.258  The court held that a reasonable buyer would not expect 
an arbitration term or any other term that materially alters the 
agreed upon contract.259  Instead, a buyer would expect only terms 
that would fill in “open terms,” such as a term specifying the exact 
area of the stadium where the buyer’s seat would be located.260  The 
court essentially used a reasonable expectations test to assess what 
types of terms, in the context of the transaction at hand, a seller 
could add to a transaction after purchase. 
Cases dealing with the extent to which credit card issuers can 
modify or add new terms to the initial cardholder agreement 
pursuant to “change in terms” provisions also reflect a judicial 
instinct for placing some subject matter limitation on the deferral of 
some terms.  Change in terms provisions, typical in credit card 
agreements, give the card issuer the right to amend or change parts 
of the original agreement.  Several courts have grappled with what 
provisions are included within the purview of change in terms 
provisions, and the reasoning frequently employed is similar to that 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine.      
For instance, in Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C.,261 the court 
assessed the enforceability of an arbitration provision in a credit card 
contract that had been added pursuant to a change in terms 
provision in the original agreement.262  Two years after the cardholder 
opened the account, the credit card issuer mailed the cardholder a 
notice indicating that unless the cardholder-plaintiff opted out, the 
issuer would add an arbitration clause to the agreement.  The issuer 
also mailed a “rejection coupon,” which the cardholder never 
returned.263 
The court held that the arbitration provision was not 
enforceable.264  The change in terms provision was not such that the 
cardholder “should have anticipated that the [issuer] would change 
                                                          
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. 341 F. Supp. 2d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 262. Id. at 191-92.  The change in terms provision was as follows:   
Changes in Terms.  We may amend or change any part of your Agreement, 
including the periodic rates and other charges, or add or remove 
requirements at any time.  If we do so, we will give you notice if required by 
law of such amendment or change.  Changes to the annual percentage 
rate(s) will apply to your account balance from the effective date of the 
change, whether or not the account balance included terms billed to the 
account before the change date and whether or not you continue to use the 
account. 
Id. at 191. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 192. 
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the method and forum for resolving disputes.”265  The change in 
terms provision and the surrounding sections of the agreement dealt 
with rates and “finance charges, credit limits, periodic statements, 
and membership fees,”266 but there was “no mention of dispute 
resolution mechanisms.”267  According to the court, there was simply 
“nothing [in the Customer Agreement that] suggest[ed] that [the 
cardholder] intended to give such unlimited power to [the issuer of 
the credit card] or that the law would sanction such a grant” to add 
an arbitration provision.268  The court held that: 
the terms discussed in the change in terms clause must supply the 
universe of terms which could be altered or affected pursuant to 
the clause.  To hold otherwise would permit the [issuer] to add 
terms to the Customer Agreement without limitation as to the 
substance or nature of such new terms.269 
An arbitration clause was simply beyond the bounds of what was 
contemplated by anything in the initial agreement.270 
Other courts have similarly held that only provisions contemplated 
by the original agreement may be added, even if opportunity to 
cancel the credit card if the terms are not acceptable exists.  For 
instance, in Perry v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp.,271 the court assessed the 
enforceability of an arbitration provision that the credit card issuer 
sought to add to its existing cardholder agreement pursuant to a 
change in terms provision.272  The plaintiffs, who were cardholders, 
argued that given the absence of any mention of dispute resolution in 
the agreement, “they did not reasonably expect that [the card issuer] 
could use its Change in Terms authority to add wholly new clauses 
regarding uncontemplated subject-matter to the contract.”273 
The court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument and refused to enforce 
the arbitration provision.274  Although the court indicated that use of 
the credit card would have constituted acceptance of the arbitration 
term, the fact that the credit card holders did not exercise the right 
to opt-out did not make the arbitration provision a part of the 
agreement.275  The original contract was quite detailed, containing 
                                                          
 265. Id. at 197. 
 266. Id. at 197-98. 
 267. Id. at 198. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. No. Civ. A. 04-507, 2004 WL 1508518, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004). 
 272. Id. at *1-2. 
 273. Id. at *2. 
 274. Id. at *4. 
 275. Id. at *4, n.4. 
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over thirty carefully worded clauses.276  However, there was no 
mention of arbitration or any other forum for dispute resolution.277  
The court noted that “nothing in these terms would alert a consumer 
to the fact that [the credit card issuer] might later impose a term 
abrogating their rights to pursue disputes in a civil forum.”278  The 
court distinguished between the ability of a card issuer to make small 
changes to “‘accommodate the unexpected,’” on the one hand, and 
“‘drastic changes’ which go beyond the scope of the provision 
providing for changes,” on the other.279  The purported change was 
simply “beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”280 
The court in Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery281 also made use of the 
doctrine of “reasonable expectations” in refusing to enforce an 
arbitration provision.  The original agreement included a change in 
terms provision stating that the card issuer has, “[a]s permitted by 
law, . . . the right to change any term or part of this agreement, 
including the rate of Finance Charge applicable to current and future 
balances.  [The issuer] will send me a written notice of any such 
changes when required by law.”282  The issuer subsequently attempted 
to add an arbitration provision to the agreement.283  Despite a public 
policy favoring arbitration, the court held that the arbitration 
provision “did not fall within the universe of subjects included in 
[the] original cardholder agreement” since the original agreement 
included no terms about alternative methods or forums for dispute 
resolution.284  According to the court, the cardholder’s reasonable 
expectation would not “include allowing [the issuer] to add a term 
not even hinted at in the original agreement.”285  The court also 
indicated that allowing the issuer to change its agreement “would 
ignore the requirement of good faith implied in all contracts of 
adhesion.”286 
Additionally, in Maestle v. Best Buy Co.,287 the court assessed a change 
in terms provision that did not include any mention of a method or 
                                                          
 276. Id. at *2. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at *4. 
 279. Id. (quoting Allstate Drilling Co. v. Martinelli, No. 02-5877, 2004 WL 253526, 
at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004)). 
 280. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981)). 
 281. 593 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 282. Id. at 426. 
 283. Id. at 426-27. 
 284. Id. at 434. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 432. 
 287. No. 79827, 2005 WL 1907282  (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005). 
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forum for resolving disputes.288  The court concluded that the 
cardholders “could not anticipate that appellants, let alone a new 
third party, would amend the agreement to add an arbitration clause, 
since the amendment provision referenced only changes to 
payments, charges, fees and interest.”289  The court noted that 
“nowhere in the contract [wa]s there a clause addressing forums of 
dispute.”290  Accordingly, the court held that the provision did not 
authorize the credit card issuer to add an arbitration clause.291 
The cases just discussed—Stone, Perry, Avery, and Maestle—are all 
relatively recent and may be seen as representing a mini-trend of 
sorts.292  These cases may reflect some desire on the part of courts to 
rethink the extent to which later terms can be added to agreements 
and to resolve the question by assessing whether a contract should 
fairly be deemed open or closed to a particular type of term. 
Of course, an ongoing agreement like a credit card agreement 
differs from the types of transactions focused on in this Article.  The 
credit card agreements are transactions completed before the 
addition of new provisions.  On the other hand, the holder of a credit 
card clearly agrees that additional terms may in fact be added, while 
in a rolling contract a buyer may only have some vague “notice” that 
this may happen.  This distinction may actually argue for a higher 
level of scrutiny of deferred terms in rolling contracts.  Nevertheless, 
while rolling contracts are not precisely like credit card agreements, 
the fluid nature of the credit card transaction makes it at least a close 
cousin to the rolling contract.  Courts that sense something less than 
savory about rolling contracts may find themselves looking to these 
                                                          
 288. See id. at *5.  The provision provided that “We may change or amend the 
terms of this Agreement upon fifteen (15) days prior written notice if required by 
law.  Any change of amended fee, charge, interest rate, FINANCE CHARGE, 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE, or minimum payment amount . . . may be effective 
to both the outstanding Account Balance and future transactions.”  Id. at *6. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Some courts have taken a position contrary to these cases.  Some of these 
courts have enforced provisions added under change in terms clauses, not because of 
contract law but because some state statutes explicitly authorize credit card issuers to 
make unilateral changes to the agreements regardless of the scope of the original 
agreement.  See, e.g., Fields v. Howe, No, IP-01-1036-C-1, 2002 WL 418011, at *4-5 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2002) (finding Delaware statutory law permits unilateral addition 
of an arbitration agreement); SouthTrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So. 2d 184, 190-91 
(Ala. 2000) (finding that Alabama statutory law allows for unilateral additions to 
cardholder agreements).  Other courts have held that a general notice that any type 
of change could be made is sufficient to include an addition of an arbitration 
provision.  See, e.g., BankOne, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 830-31 (S.D. Miss. 
2001) aff’d, 34 Fed. Appx. 964 (5th Cir. 2002); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 
793 N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
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credit card cases to find some way to cabin the seller’s ability to add 
terms to the contract. 
If the version of reasonable expectations I discuss had been applied 
in Hill, for example, the court would likely have concluded that terms 
fleshing out the warranty or the parameters of “lifetime support” 
described in the advertisements were within the buyers’ reasonable 
expectations.293  Such terms would simply have been filling in the 
details.  But the arbitration clause would likely have been deemed 
beyond the pale and would not have been enforced.  Such a result 
reflects an appropriate balancing of the needs and interests of both 
buyers and sellers. 
CONCLUSION 
As rolling contracts continue to proliferate, it becomes ever clearer 
that simply treating deferred terms as though they were provided 
before or during purchase is, at best, a stopgap measure, not a viable 
or fair solution.  Courts must reassess, as some courts are beginning 
to do, the nearly unfettered ability given to sellers to defer terms.  
Template Notice provides courts with a workable and principled 
mechanism for recalibrating the balance between buyers and sellers 
in rolling contracts.  Template Notice should be a particularly 
attractive approach since it is a logical extension, but not upending, 
of tools courts have routinely used to police standardized contracts. 
 
                                                          
 293. For a full discussion of Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th 
Cir. 1997), see discussion supra Parts I and II.A. 
